Alvin Plantinga's proper function epistemology is an incipient virtues epistemology of a sort that we call personal virtues epistemology.
dependency of proper epistemic function on emotions is quite general and not limited to the context of religious belief.
So our proposed extension of Plantinga's views has two aspects. On the one side, we think that proper epistemic functioning is not limited to the functioning of the faculties, but is more broadly the proper functioning of the epistemic agent as a person, so that traits of the person and not merely traits of the faculties are the basis for warrant in many important cases. And on the other side, we want to say that these intellectual virtues, as traits of persons, are intimately connected in a variety of ways with proper emotional functioning. We assume that, just as the proper functioning of parts of things depends on the condition those parts are in (the proper functioning of the eye depends on its being in a physical condition that experts would consider a state of health of the eye), so the proper functioning of persons, in epistemic contexts as well as others, depends on the persons' being in certain conditions that we call virtues. We are especially interested in Plantinga's recent interest in the emotions, since we think that pretty much the whole range of virtues, both intellectual and moral, are in part dispositions with respect to emotions.
3 Speaking a little loosely for summary's sake, we might say that the virtues that concern us here involve proper orderings of emotions. Such dispositional orderings are the bases for the kind of epistemic functioning that interests us.
In the first section we discuss Plantinga's application of his theory of warrant to
Christian beliefs, since this will nicely illustrate the need for both sides of our extension.
The integration of functions of the "intellect" and the "will" in producing Christian knowledge is a model for the production of much important human knowledge; and the need for the transformative development of these functions into the virtue of faith is a model for other bases of proper epistemic function. In the second section we make some general comments about the nature of virtues. In the third, we argue that epistemic virtues are, in large part, dispositions with respect to emotions, and we identify seven respects in which this is so. The fourth section is an illustration of our extension, and in the conclusion we comment about the nature of the epistemology we are proposing.
Warranted Christian Belief
Christian belief is a special kind of theism; that is, the Christian believes there is a personal being who is all powerful, all knowing, and all benevolent, who created the world. This belief can be warranted for her, since according to Plantinga's model (which is a souped-up version of John Calvin and Thomas Aquinas), humans have a faculty for knowing God (the sensus divinitatis, in Calvin's phrase) which, when functioning properly, gives rise, typically without inference, to the belief that there is such a being, in response to a range of rather diverse stimuli, such as perceptions of the starry heavens;
"the majestic grandeur of the mountains…; the ancient brooding presence of the Australian outback" (WCB, 174); also to moments of realizing one has done something cheap, and moments of grave danger. According to the model, God created us with this faculty as an access to the truth that he exists, and he made it such that it is triggered by situations typical of the kind of environment we find ourselves in. So on Plantinga's view of warrant, a person is warranted in believing in God in case she holds this belief with a certain degree of conviction, and her belief is produced by the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis.
It seems to us that Plantinga's account of warranted religious belief is like a chrysalis just on the point of becoming a lovely butterfly of virtue theory. Plantinga recommends a revision of Calvin's claim that God's existence is a truth "of which each of us is master from his mother's womb." 4 He says we should not think of the sensus divinitatis as an innate faculty fully present from birth (as eyesight more or less is), but as a capacity for knowledge of God, "like the capacity for arithmetical knowledge. …The development of the sensus divinitatis requires a certain maturity (although it is often manifested by very young children)" (WCB, 173). In this respect of being susceptible to development the sensus divinitatis is like many other faculties. The auditory faculty is thus a capacity for discriminating sounds, say for distinguishing people's voices from one another. But some people develop this power of discrimination better than others. And it can be refined considerably (in some people, at least) by special disciplines like the ear training that budding composers receive in conservatories of music. Similarly, practitioners of religion may have a fine-tunement of the sensus divinitatis that is a personal trait, something like the sensitivity that friends develop for one another, who are "alive" to one another's minds, who understand one another on the slightest cues. The virtue that Christians call faith is such a developed sensitivity. 5 As Brother Lawrence 6 says, Christians "practice the presence of God," presumably becoming more sensitive to God's presence (both more accurately discriminating of it and more vividly impressed by it). Plantinga quotes Aquinas approvingly:
But this [natural knowledge of God] admits of a mixture of many errors.
Some people have believed that there is no other orderer of worldly things than the celestial bodies, and so they said that the celestial bodies are gods.
Other people pushed it farther, to the very elements and the things generated from them, thinking that motion and the natural function which these elements have are not present in them as the effect of some other orderer, but that other things are ordered by them. 7 Plantinga notes wryly that if the outputs of the sensus divinitatis include such beliefs as these, then contemporary naturalists like Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins would count as having a natural knowledge of God (WCB, 177). It seems that this faculty can take several developmental directions, some of which yield beliefs that are inconsistent with theism. The conclusion seems pretty obvious: for the sensus to yield anything that could reasonably be called knowledge of God (that is, warranted true belief in God), an appropriate development of it is needed. As Aquinas would say, it needs to be "perfected." But "perfection of a natural faculty" is Aquinas's definition of a virtue. 8 The virtue in this case would seem to be faith or something approaching it. A virtue is neither the faculty nor the proper functioning of the faculty, but the disposition of the faculty to function properly, or better, as we will argue in the next section, it is the disposition of the person to function properly with respect to one or more faculties. It is what we have called the "basis" of the proper functioning.
In a discussion of the possibility that theism is true but belief in God lacks warrant, Plantinga canvasses the parts of his definition of warrant to see which ones might be absent compatibly with the truth of theism. About the congenial environment condition, he says "there seems no reason at all to think our epistemic environment is not the one for which [God] The extended model shows how it is possible for Christians to be warranted in believing such distinctively Christian claims as that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. The extended model has three chief elements: the Bible, the work of the Holy Spirit, and faith. Our current interest in this part of the model is the positive epistemic role it assigns to emotions, and we are interested in emotions' epistemic role because of their close connection, in classic discussions, with traits of whole persons.
On the extended A / C model the sensus divinitatis has been corrupted by sin and consequently will work properly only if healed by an event or process of salvation from sin. Such healing has been accomplished by a sequence of actions of God, in which Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son, lived a morally perfect life of service and was executed as a criminal by sinful humankind, thus suffering a death in which he atoned for the sins of the very sinners at whose hands he violently died. God raised Jesus from the dead and drew him back permanently into his presence. The story of this salvation is recorded and interpreted in the Bible, which is inspired by the Spirit of God, who also works in the hearts of people to convict them of the central truths that the Bible enshrines, such conviction being an important part of the process of salvation.
Sin is not only a corruption of the sensus divinitatis (our intellectual equipment with respect to God), but also of our will (our faculty for loving, obeying, and enjoying God or is it more like a mental event, an episode that perhaps recurs regularly in the life of the believer, but is not a state or condition of the believer's character? and 2) What is the relation between the two aspects of faith, the beliefs and the emotions, and of the faculties underlying these, the intellect and the will? To put the question somewhat vaguely, are these aspects internally related, or related only in some external, say causal, way? Plantinga's discussion does not contain decisive answers to these questions, but its drift seems to be towards thinking of faith in episodic, rather than dispositional terms, and towards regarding intellect and will as rather independent, externally related faculties.
This drift tends to impede the growth of Plantinga's proper function theory into a virtue epistemology. But the tradition from which he derives the extended A / C model seems to give different answers to these questions, and ones which, we will argue, are more plausible. Let us begin with the second question.
On Plantinga's A / C model, the sensus divinitatis is an intellectual faculty, the function of which is not shared by the will. Although the operation of the intellect can influence that of the will, and vice versa, and although Plantinga himself refuses to assign any strict priority to the one or the other in the production of religious knowledge, he makes the functions of these two faculties strictly non-overlapping. For example, he spends about twelve pages in chapter nine of WCB discussing the fundamental natural yearning of the human heart for God (this being surely a function of the will; we might call it the appetitio divinitatis), but does not make it part of the sensus divinitatis. When he speaks of the two faculties together, as they unite in faith, he uses purely conjunctive expressions, as in "We therefore need a change of attitude in addition to a change of opinion" (WCB, 270, italics added; see also 292, 293, 294, 295).
Jonathan Edwards does not seem to separate will and intellect as Plantinga does.
He seems closer to the view that in matters of Christian faith, at any rate, the will is a properly epistemic faculty. He writes that spiritual understanding consists in a sense of the heart, of the supreme beauty and sweetness of the holiness or moral perfection of divine things, together with all that discerning and knowledge of things of religion, that depends upon, and flows from such a sense. …I say, a sense of heart; for it is not speculation merely that is concerned in this kind of understanding; nor can there be a clear distinction made between the two faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and separately, in this matter. When the mind is sensible of the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing, that implies a sensibleness of sweetness and delight in the presence of the idea of it: and this sensibleness of the amiableness or delightfulness of beauty, carries in the very nature of it, the sense of the heart; or an effect and impression the soul is the subject of, as a substance possessed of taste, inclination and will. 9 Edwards here distinguishes two kinds of knowledge and two kinds of faculties that produce them. "Speculation" produces knowledge of such things as the nature of a triangle, while knowledge of "the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing" is produced by "a sense of the heart," something like a perceptual faculty that is a seat of inclination and is capable of being pleased or displeased. Thus two kinds of knowledge, one produced by the intellect, the other by the will.
Let us illustrate what we think this means, using a non-religious example.
Imagine two equally intelligent people witnessing the following scene: Because of his race, a member of a racial minority is subtlely directed away from a white neighborhood in which he would like to buy a home, by the real estate agent who is helping him. The action is subtle enough to require intelligent discernment on the part of the two observers.
They both understand the real estate agent's action, but they have different emotional reactions to it. One of them is highly displeased. She feels angry at the agent and sad for the home buyer, whom she sees as a representative of a long history of senseless suffering at the hands of prejudice. The other observer feels no displeasure; instead she is mildly amused by the agent's adroit maneuvers and even feels a little admiration of his skill in handling such "problems." In one sense both observers understand what is going on, but only one of them "tastes" the injustice in the situation. Even the morally indifferent observer may be able to subsume the current case under the category injustice,
thus showing her mastery of the concept of injustice, her moral understanding of the situation. But we want to say that by contrast with the emotional observer, she is still missing something epistemically: she does not appreciate the injustice, feel it or perceive it as the nasty thing it is. She has a "notional" understanding of the action as an injustice, but in a moral or spiritual sense there is something she's not "getting." Thus the emotion is a peculiar and indispensable mode of knowing something. The "will" is crossing over into the area of the "intellect," supplying a kind of "cognition" that the "intellect" by itself cannot produce. Or perhaps it is better to say, with Edwards, that "a clear distinction [cannot be] made between the two faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and separately, in this matter." (This is one epistemic function of emotions; several others will be discussed in the penultimate section of this paper.)
Thus on our view, the affections are themselves sometimes a source of knowledge. But they are far more than that. They are at the very heart of the personal life; emotional dispositions are a large part of what we call personality, and affect our actions and shape our relationships, not only with God but with our fellow human beings. 10 Taken together, these two things -the epistemic importance of emotions and their general centrality to human life in all its aspects -suggest that an analysis of epistemic proper functioning needs to be understood in the larger context of character.
The neat division that has traditionally been drawn between the intellectual and the affective, between the intellectual virtues and the moral ones, is artificial. We will argue this thesis further in later sections of this paper.
But before proceeding to that, let us turn to the first of our two questions that will manifest the butterfly of virtue latent in Plantinga's proper function theory of knowledge.
That question is about the nature of faith. Is faith a virtue -that is, a trait of the believer, an abiding dispositional quality of personality -or is it something more episodic, an event or process that goes on in the believer at conversion and is then repeated at other junctures of life? As a case of the joint proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis and the appetitio divinitatis, is faith a personality condition underlying the functioning, or is it simply the functioning itself? Consider first Jonathan Edwards, who regards faith as a "new nature."
'Tis very true, that all grace and goodness in the hearts of the saints is entirely from God; and they are universally and immediately dependent on him for it. But yet… He gives his Spirit to be united to the faculties of the soul, and to dwell there after the manner of a principle of nature; so that the soul, in being endued with grace, is endued with a new nature: but nature is an abiding thing (342).
Thus even if human contributions to the formation of faith such as religious education, choices of yielding one's members to God as instruments of righteousness, voluntarily undertaken spiritual disciplines, modeling of one Christian on another, efforts of selfsurveillance and self-correction, etc., are somehow entirely the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit, still faith is, in Edwards's view, a virtue in the sense that it is an abiding disposition resulting from an inward change. It is not merely the sum of the Holy Spirit's discrete actions, in pulling strings and pushing levers in the converted.
We have not been able to find a text in which Plantinga describes faith as a virtue, character trait, disposition, or new nature. He tends to characterize it, instead, in two episodic ways, as a warranting belief forming process and as knowledge in the sense of the warranted judgments that are produced by this process. For example, …on this model, faith is a belief-producing process or activity, like perception or memory. It is a cognitive device, a means by which belief, and belief on a certain specific set of topics, is regularly produced in regular ways. In this it resembles memory, perception, reason, sympathy, induction, and other more standard belief-producing processes. It differs from them in that it also involves the direct action of the Holy Spirit, so that the immediate cause of belief is not to be found just in [the believer's] natural epistemic equipment (WCB, 256; Plantinga's italics).
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It is also the warranted beliefs about the great things of the gospel that are produced by this process.
The result of the work of the Holy Spirit is faith -which, according to both John Calvin and the model, is 'a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence towards us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit' (WCB, 290).
But it seems to us utterly natural for someone who is concerned with Christian faith as a proper epistemic process and its outputs also to be concerned with the dispositional base of that process, with the character of the person whose restored sensus divinitatis puts out true and warranted beliefs about God. This extension is particularly appropriate, given the preoccupation of the New Testament and the Christian tradition with the transformation of whole persons in conversion and sanctification, as exemplified in the passage we quoted a moment ago from Edwards. As Edwards also stresses, that transformation is largely a transformation of the will, the seat of the affections (the will being at the very heart of the person), and Plantinga's concurrence with Edwards on that point thus puts him on the verge of emerging as a virtues theorist.
As a virtue, faith is a polyconsequential disposition, issuing in actions, emotions, and judgments. The more faith a person has, the more and / or better (by Christian standards) will be the actions, emotions, and judgments in which that faith issues. The quality and quantity of each of these "issues" bear on warrant. Consider actions. Some
Christians act on faith more regularly and with less environmental stimulus and support than others, making sacrifices for the sake of the gospel, performing acts of compassion in imitation of Christ and for his sake, bearing witness in hostile environments to the good news of the gospel. Christians differ from one another in the boldness and consistency with which they act out of faith. This difference bears on warrant because, as common experience in Christian circles attests, not only does bold action come from conviction, but conviction grows out of bold action. And as Plantinga affirms, confidence of belief bears on warrant.
Consider emotions. On the account of emotions we commend, they are a kind of immediate impression or "perception" of situations in terms of their propositional content, including the evaluations involved. 12 The joy that is characteristic of faith is an impression of the goodness of what God has done for us in Christ; faith's gratitude is an impression of God's unmerited benevolence towards us; faith's hope is a perception of the wonderfulness of our eternal future. On this quasi-Edwardsian account, then, the religious affections are to the value of the great things of the gospel something like what being appeared to redly is to the belief that something red is before one: they are a kind of non-inferential ground of beliefs (judgments). As the proper functioning of the will / intellect in this basic belief-forming way, they bear on warrant.
Consider judgments. The person of faith will daily make many judgments corollary to the great things of the gospel: My [dead] mother is enjoying the presence of
God. This person who has just cheated me out of $50 is someone for whom Christ died.
The twinge of envy I just felt is evidence of the corruption of my heart. Etc. As a disposition that can be more or less deeply or fully formed or mature in a person, it is a disposition with respect to which Christians differ from one another. Not only will the person of greater faith make more judgments corollary to the great things of the gospel, he will make them more spontaneously and with greater conviction and confidence. This variance of confidence will affect warrant, on Plantinga's view, for he thinks that, if other elements of warrant are in place, of two persons believing the same proposition the one who believes it with greater conviction or confidence has greater warrant.
Epistemic Functioning and the Concept of a Virtue
We are arguing that Plantinga's proper function theory of knowledge needs to be completed in a virtue account that bases epistemic proper functioning not just in healthy epistemic faculties narrowly conceived, but in certain virtues that are both qualifications of the person's emotional life and patterns of use of the epistemic faculties involved. We are not claiming that to have sufficient warrant to be knowledge all beliefs must be generated from such virtues; our claim, rather, is that some very important kinds of beliefs cannot, in practice, be generated without the virtues. We have illustrated our point using Plantinga's application of his theory to religious belief. We think it is significant that here, where by powers to acquire, maintain, transmit, or apply knowledge. 13 Such virtues are generically human (not field-specific) because such involvements with knowledge are generically human. We gave a list of such traits in the opening paragraph of this paper. What is the relation between virtues such as these and the epistemic faculties?
We have faculties that enable us to form correct beliefs when they are functioning
properly, but that is just the beginning of the story about proper epistemic functioning.
Coming to know, as well as maintaining, transmitting, and applying our knowledge often depends on the skillful deployment of these faculties, on culture-bound cultivation of the faculty or of parts of the mind that function in deployments of the faculty, and depends in the typical case on the personal aims, desires and attachments, emotions and actions of the knower. As knowers or would-be knowers, we are not just a coordination of faculties, analogous to an automobile which is nothing but a coordination of functional parts. People are epistemic agents -beings equipped with faculties for knowing things, who pursue knowledge by various means which centrally involve those faculties. To the extent that epistemic faculties are equipment, they may sometimes function magnificently and yet not generate knowledge of the kind they were designed to yield, just as a car might function perfectly with respect to engine, brakes, and other parts, and yet not be functioning very well as transportation if driven by a driver who didn't care where he was going or periodically depressed the brake pedal just to enjoy the sensation of being precipitated forward in the seat. Such intellectual openness will have an emotional dimension. For example, the open person will either not feel too much anxiety about revising significant beliefs or will be able to master the anxiety he has, so as to make appropriate revisions. He will be eager to improve his beliefs, and so will greet criticisms with hope, readily 15 feel discomfort with beliefs that begin to seem wrong to him, and take satisfaction in revisions. On the other hand, over the long haul our beliefs will have more warrant if we do not too easily give up our beliefs, hypotheses, and research programs, but persevere in them long enough to understand, develop, and test them well. Such intellectual tenacity or perseverance will also have an emotional dimension: the tenacious person will have reasonable, well tempered confidence in herself as an epistemic agent, a confidence that will get her through the hard times and reinforce the hopefulness with which she addresses the tasks of the easier days. She will be relatively little beset with the emotion of impatience, and will be able to find satisfaction or joy in the small increments of progress that she may achieve from day to day and week to week, while at the same time keeping focused with hopefulness on the longer-term goals of her research. Behind both openness and tenacity is what might be counted as yet a third virtue: an enthusiasm and taste for knowing.
Coordinated with these three virtues in the epistemically well functioning person is a power of judgment, fairly specific to the particular knowledge in question, as to when to persevere and when to abandon a hypothesis or line of inquiry. Because of its specificity to a field or research question, such judgment may be best thought of as a skill rather than a virtue.
The analogy of car and driver has limited application, since what are called epistemic faculties are not all well thought of as equipment. They depart from this category in at least two ways. In our discussion of Plantinga's interpretation of Edwards,
we counted the will as a faculty and said it can function well or badly. But it seems odd to designate the will as a piece of equipment on a par with eyesight or hearing or the ability to calculate. A deaf or blind person can be an excellent person, but to have a perverted or non-functioning will -chronically inappropriate desires, emotions, and attachments, and a disposition to make bad choices, or the complete lack of any of these powers -seems to be almost a definition of the deepest human dysfunction. The will seems to be the center of the person or personality, and this is shown by the fact that it is odd to speak of using the will well or badly. It is true that a person can dissociate from some deliverances of his will, such as some desires and emotions (thus criticizing and / or controlling them), but there is always some perspective of the will that is not dissociated from and can thus not be regarded as "used" even in this attenuated sense. By contrast, it makes perfectly good sense to speak of using inferential powers or hearing or memory. So in the automobile analogy, the center of the will, at any rate, is not the car, but the driver. But most epistemologists who speak of epistemic faculties do not include the will among them, and as we have seen, even Plantinga is reluctant to make the will a straightforwardly epistemic faculty.
So not all faculties are equipment. But even faculties that are straightforwardly equipment-like, such as vision and the power of a priori reasoning, seem to be subject to development and deep integration into other aspects of life, and in this way are unlike ordinary equipment. As we get better at driving, the steering wheel and the engine do not improve, but only the driver. By contrast, we do not just get better at using our hearing and vision, but the faculties themselves seem to become more discriminating, say with musical Consider, for example, the power by which one is enabled and disposed to recognize subtle influences of envy and greed in one's own thoughts and actions that are to all outward appearances generous; or that combination of tenacity and openness in intellectual pursuits that we mentioned earlier. These are kinds of epistemic formation that do make their subject excellent as a person, and they are such not only because they have a generality that makes them applicable across a wide range of situations and topics, but also because they draw on concerns and powers that are basic to the constitution of good character.
Emotions and the Acquisition of Knowledge
In commenting on our illustrations we have stressed ways in which the intellectually virtuous person's emotions are qualified because we are interested in virtues that are attributable to the person and not merely to his parts, and we take human emotions to arise, typically, out of concerns that may be deeply determinative of one's character or personality. 16 Let us canvass some of the main ways that emotion-dispositions enter into the virtues that make us excellent epistemic agents.
First, a "passion" for knowledge (interest in it) seems likely to promote the acquisition of it, and to promote high quality knowledge. A striking example of intellectual enthusiasm is Barbara McClintock, the Nobel Prize-winning geneticist.
Driven by her interest in corn chromosomes she spent about sixty years doing meticulous studies that yielded several innovative findings fundamental to 20 th century genetics, despite gender discrimination which prevented her having a significant university post, as well as the incomprehension of other scientists due to the complexity of her research and the unconventionality of her ideas. Her story makes clear that she was less interested in the fame, power, and fortune that sometimes accrues to successful scientists than she was in corn chromosomes and how they work. After a scientific meeting at which her summary of her discoveries "fell like a lead balloon" on the ears of fellow scientists, she commented, "I was startled when I found they didn't understand it, didn't take it seriously. But it didn't bother me. I just knew I was right. People get the idea that your McClintock discovered, it seems clear that a passion (that is, emotion disposition) like hers, which generates not only the joy she speaks of, but also on occasion frustration, hope, disappointment, anxiety, anger, and other emotions, is an important ground of its acquisition. Here the emotions manifest or instantiate the concern for knowledge; this concern is a source of warrant analogous to the proper functioning of the cognitive equipment. It is an intellectual proper functioning of the will ("the will to know") and as such is partially constitutive of intellectual virtues such as tenacity, openness, humility, and honesty. Emotions with the requisite objects may thus be manifestations of intellectual virtues.
Second, Plantinga has noted that degree of warrant can vary with degree of felt inclination to believe. 18 For example, one is typically more warranted in believing that 2+2=4 than in believing the solution to a complex differential equation because one is more strongly inclined to the former than to the latter belief. In our discussion of Plantinga's religious epistemology we suggested that a person's emotional disposition may affect such inclination; the same is true in scientific epistemology. Consider Barbara
McClintock again, proposing her genetic hypothesis to a disbelieving scientific community, yet retaining the strong conviction that she is right. Then imagine another scientist who has gathered the same evidence and arrived at the same conclusion, but who, because of vanity and lack of intellectual autonomy, is put off by his colleagues' disbelief, and wavers in his conviction that he is right. If Plantinga's point is correct,
McClintock is more warranted in her belief than her colleague is in his, even if they have the same belief and the same evidence for it. It seems clear that the difference between the two scientists is one of character, and in particular, of their emotional dispositions.
McClintock's intellectual autonomy is afforded by her passionate interest in the plants and the questions about how they work, nearly to the exclusion of concern (and the correlative emotions) about professional reputation; but the other scientist, in anxiety to be well regarded by his colleagues, loses sight of the truths he has garnered. person whose joy should be an occasion for her to rejoice too. 25 The cognitive virtue of self-insight seems to have two "emotional" components: a transparency to one's own emotions (a tendency to feel them), and an ability to "read" them. The ability to read them is itself an emotional ability. Consider a person who feels envy and knows that this is a symptom of an inappropriately competitive character, but feels nothing about feeling envy (feels no discomfort, no shame, no anxiety or dismay). Such a person does not have the fullest form of self-insight because, while she "knows" what she is, she does not fully appreciate it. If one's emotions can be an access to knowledge of one's own character, observations of other people's emotions can be an access to knowledge of their character, an access sometimes less ambiguous than the observation of their actions. This epistemic virtue -we might call it character-insight -like self-insight, depends on the ability to experience and appreciate emotions. This fact is highlighted by cases of persons who conspicuously lack the ability, like Temple Grandin, a highly intelligent autistic woman discussed by Oliver Sacks. that she has been lying to you…. …Now I propose to describe these phenomena in terms of 'impeding proper function'…. 27 In connection with emotions' power to impede knowledge, two virtues reminiscent of classical ones stand out as corrective. Let us say that temperance is a disposition to have
proper, and only proper, emotions and appetites. 28 The more temperate a person is, the less her knowledge-gathering and -maintaining will be impeded by improper emotions.
But some of the emotions that impede knowledge are not improper in themselves, and so even the temperate person may have episodes of passion that undermine knowledge, and thus be in need of the virtue of self-control, which is the ability to evaluate and set aside, disregard, transcend, suppress, or otherwise manage emotions, desires, and impulses that, at a given moment of life, are contrary to one's purposes, whether these passions are strictly speaking improper or just inopportune. Because emotions do often undermine the processes of knowledge-acquisition and -maintenance, warrant will often depend on a person's having these virtues. If impatience often induces people to form beliefs without the labor and care that alone would give them warrant, then patience, in one or more of two possible forms, will be an important virtue for aspiring knowers. In its temperance form, patience will be the disposition not to have improper impulses of impatience, but to be satisfied to move along in one's research at an appropriate pace, taking each moment and each day as it comes. In its self-control form, patience will consist in an alertness to the detriments that impatience threatens, an ability to recognize impulses of impatience as such and to cut through any rationalizations that might dim one's awareness of those impulses, and both a motivation and an ability to manage those impulses so they do not undermine the acquisition of knowledge.
In several ways, then, emotions determine human epistemic functioning for good and for ill, and so must be taken account of in any construction of proper epistemic functioning. Emotion dispositions and emotion-directed dispositions that promote knowledge are aspects of the base for proper functioning of human epistemic agents. As such, they are traits of the persons whose beliefs are most likely to have warrant.
An Illustration
Consider Plantinga's discussion of a passage from John Locke, who imagines a seasoned professor confronted all of a sudden with a bright graduate student who makes a point that undermines a fundamental principle of the professor's life's work.
Would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned professor, and that which his scarlet would blush at, to have his authority of forty years So we need to assess not just faculties, but their integration into the character of the epistemic agent. Perhaps it is psychologically needful that people have a defense against devastating shame, but adjustments are possible here, and normatively called for.
One might think that the professor is overly ashamed, or ashamed of what is not really or deeply shameful; or that it would be better for his defenses to be more permeable than they are. By contrast with Alston, Locke's professor is one in whom the defense mechanism may be functioning properly if construed in isolation from the larger context of the purposes of his life, but is functioning in such a way as to make him something of an intellectual coward. His defense mechanism is functioning properly in the way that the eyesight of a person with 20-20 vision is functioning properly, despite the fact that her visual assessments of people's emotional states are skewed.
On a plausible description of the professor's mind, taking cues from Locke's references to his authority and his reverend beard, the professor's failure to hear the student's point is due to the emotional structure of his personality (his self-image as important and learned and his emotional attachment to that self-image; the subordination of the concern for truth to the concern to be respected). By contrast, on a plausible description of Alston's mind, it is not just that he did his epistemic duty so as to form the belief that the jig was up for monolithic theories of justification. Instead, the order of his concerns was somewhat different from that of the professor; his character was differently formed. Getting it right philosophically was a powerful enough concern to override the concern to maintain the full lustre of his previous accomplishments. If the difference between these professors is in the excellence of their faculties, it is largely a difference in the functioning of their wills. But it is also a difference in their functioning as epistemic agents. And this difference bears quite directly on the warrant of their beliefs.
Conclusion
We have argued that proper function epistemology requires completion as a virtues epistemology of a particular sort that we have called personal virtues epistemology.
Personal virtues are excellences of the whole person rather than of the narrowly epistemic faculties. In particular we have argued that for the knower to function properly as a knower, his will, especially as a source of emotions or affections, needs to be shaped and completed to form such epistemic virtues as charity, fairness, intellectual honesty, love of knowledge (truth), perseverance, openness, caution, boldness, and humility. Such virtues tend to increase the epistemic desideratum of warrant, among other desiderata, not for all kinds of knowledge but very much for the more difficult and important kinds.
At a conference on virtue epistemology, and partly in response to our exploration of epistemic humility at that conference, 32 However, Plantinga pointed out that virtue epistemology is not well suited to promote a project that has dominated epistemology since Gettier and before: that of defining knowledge. Any definition that places virtues among the necessary conditions of knowledge will be far too strong. It will rule out simple cases of perceptual knowledge and slightly more complex ones like our example of the child who knows his mother has come home when she calls out upon arrival. Nor is any amount of virtue, generating true belief, sufficient for knowledge. For example, imagine that Hank has a brain tumor that is emitting, in some eccentric way, data from which Hank concludes, by honest and persevering research and charitable interpretations of his interlocutors and heroic openness to new ideas, that he has a brain tumor. Even though Hank believes truly that he has a brain tumor, and came to this belief by way of calling upon impressive intellectual virtues, he does not know that he has a brain tumor.
We agree. Personal virtue epistemology is not well suited to the project of defining knowledge. We do not know whether proper functionalism or any other theory can define knowledge. The history of efforts to define knowledge in the twentieth century is strewn with corpses of theories exploded by ingenious counterexamples. But we understand many concepts for which we do not have strict definitions, and the goal of personal virtue epistemology is to promote our understanding of epistemic agents, especially when they are engaged in the pursuit of the more difficult and important kinds of knowledge. The strict definition of knowledge is not our aim. not the central sense of the word in modern English. Also, as will be seen later in the paper, to say that virtues in our sense are dispositions with respect to emotions is not to deny that they are dispositions with respect to other things, such as actions and judgments. On our view, emotions, actions, and judgments are capable of a complex set of internal relations. For example, a person often judges the content of his emotion to be true and is thereby moved to perform an action whose reason is also the content of his emotion and his judgment. 15 The less open person may be capable of feeling this discomfort, but tend to repress or ignore such emotions, and will accordingly feel them less readily. 
